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ANALYTICAL LIMITS OF EMANCIPATION AND CUSTODY

USTODY is a slippery word. The courts do not always use it to
cover the same things. For instance, is custody co-extensive

with the parent's rights in and duties toward the child, so that
the parent can "give" all these rights and duties to another when he gives
custody? And again, if the parent did give custody for the whole minority
of the child, would this be tantamount to emancipating the child so far as
any residuum of rights and duties in the parent was concerned? Although
the language of the courts (and worse still, their thought) on these points
is highly confusing, it seems fair to say, summarily, that custody is a term
applied to interests less than all the rights and duties of the parent. Even
after the parent has given the longest and fullest rights of custody that he
possibly could to another, he still has a residuum of rights and duties.,
This basic confusion has in turn been brought about by the persistence
of courts in talking about "total" and "partial" emancipation.2 But when
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'Regina v. Smith, 22L.J.Q.B. 1x6 (1853); In re Edwards, 4 2 L.J.Q.B. 99 (1873); Washaw v.
Gimble, 50 Ark. 35I, 7 S.W. 389 (1888); Hernandez v. Thomas, go Fla. 522, 39 So. 641 (1905);
Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 65o (88xi); Wood v. Shaw, 92 Kan. 70, 139 Pac. x165 (1914);
Stapleton v. Poynter, xii Ky. 264, 62 S.W. 730 (19oi); Marks v. Wooster, 199 S.W. 466 (Mo.
App. 1917); State ex rel. Hodgdon v. Libbey, 44 N.H. 321 (1862); Cook v. Bybee, 24 Tex. 278

(,859).
2 For instance, the courts often say there is total emancipation by consent of the parent and
the child, which is properly evidenced. Memphis Steel Construction Co. v. Lister, 138 Tenn.
307, 197 S.W. 902 (19X7). But in saying this the courts seem to forget that this is only what
the parties agree to, and that the state itself through its public policy fixes the duty of the
parent to care for a minor child in need regardless of any and all agreements of the parties
themselves. Cf. Hall v. Hall, 44 N.H. 293 (1852); see 34 Harv. L. Rev. 334 (1921); 16 Ill. L.
Rev. 243 (1921).
It is also said that emancipation occurs by operation of law i) where the parent abandons
the child; 2) where the child marries, with or without parents' consent; 3) where the child
attains his majority. But these situations (except the last, under which, of course, the child is
of age and there is no more problem) are merely situations where the rights and duties of parent
and child are inoperative, and do not affect the ultimate duty of the parent to the child in case
of need, and the child's corresponding duties if the parent does care for him. And this is true
even though under emancipation the child's earnings are his own and cannot be reached by the
parents' creditors, and pass to the child's administrator on the child's death. Partridge v.
Arnold, 73 Ill. 6oo (1874); Smith v. Knowlton, ii N.H. 191 (184o); cf. 33 Yale LJ. 663 (1924);
24 Mich. L. Rev. 862 (1926).
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we examine the actual holdings of the cases, it seems that there is no such
animal as "total" emancipation, in the sense that a parent, even with the
express agreement of the child himself, or the agreement of third persons
as well, can ever free himself from all obligations to the child, or all consequent rights in the child. 3 For instance, no court has ever held squarely
that a parent is not liable for the care of a child who later becomes sick or
disabled, no matter how "complete" the previous emancipation may have
been. 4 The courts avoid saying this flatly by calling it "partial" emancipation, when they want to hold the parent still liable to the child under
the circumstances. 5 But this is obviously an evasion (though often unconscious or well intended), to construct a category in which they shall be
free to say that a parent is still liable to the child because there never was
a "complete" emancipation.' This innocent sleight-of-hand in analytical
reasoning is brought to book by the plain fact that no instance of "complete" emancipation can be found in the reports, in the sense that the
parent is held to have absolved himself completely from all duties to his
child in time of need and under unexpected circumstances, no matter how
sweeping and unequivocal were the terms of the alleged emancipation or
the purported grant of custody.
The plain truth is that the unqualified granting of rights in the parentchild relationship is not possible under the common law, and is equally restricted in the courts of equity, where most of the rights of parent and
child are usually determined. "Giving" and "granting" are terms that
have grown up with the law of property, and are not literally comparable
to the varied and complicated rights and duties within the family. We
would expect the words "giving" and "granting" to deal with the transfer
of the possessory interest in property or of the property itself. But even
the parent does not have "possession" of his own child and he cannot
transfer a possession to another when he does not have it himself. The
only place where we have literal possession in the case of human beings is
in the case of chattel slavery, and there are a number of cases decided in
the southern states before the Civil War that seem to put decided limits to
People v. Mercein, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 399, 410 (1842). As an incident to this, the awarding of
custody by a parent is held to be revocable in a basic sense, since it is revoked on the death of
the parent making it, if the other parent survives. Smith v. Young, 136 Mo. App. 65, 1z7 S.W.
628 (x9o8).
4 Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 238, '54 N.W. 1097 (1915); Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa I5,
44 N.W. 295 (i89o).

STorrington v. Norwich,

21

Conn. *543 (1852).

6 Commonwealth v. Graham, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N.E. 706 (X892); Cochran v. Cochran, 196

N.Y. 86, 89 N.E. 470 (909).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

the doctrine even in this instance.7 In a word, the rights and duties of a
parent in his child at law and in equity are far too complicated and far too
elusive to be subsumed under such rule-of-thumb property terms as
"give" or "grant," in the sense that the parent, even with the assent of the
child and of third persons, can finally release himself of all his rights and
duties to a child, no matter how completely he may intend to do so. Any
other result makes us talk of "giving" custody, or "granting" emancipation, as if we were selling a slave, or transferring a piece of land, and is as
offensive to moral values, and to the requisites of modem culture, as it is
unsound in legal analysis and unsupported by court decisions. 9
CUSTODY IS A MATTER OF VARYING RELATIONS, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES

We rightly think of custody as the immediate supervision and control
of a child.' 0 By reasonable implication, it usually carries with it various
duties to the child by way of care and support, and it may also carry
rights to the child's services and other advantages." But these rights and
duties may be said to vary with circumstances. In other words, they are
not inseparable from the right of custody alone, and they may remain
with the parent and be exercised by him in spite of his granting custody
generally to another." Thus even in divorce proceedings where complete

custody is granted to the wife, although the husband is ordered to support
the child, some courts will hold that the right to the child's earnings is
given to the mother, as incident to her right of custody; other courts will
award this right to the father, feeling that such earnings are more nearly
incident to the duty of support which the father, in this instance, is discharging.'3 But the courts do talk about complete emancipation, as if
7 State v. Taylor, 2 McCord (S.C.) 483 (x822); Commonwealth v. Carver, 5 Rand. (Va.)
66o (I827).

8Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (i9i6).
9Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (19o8); Merrill v. Hussey, ioi Me. 439,
64 Atl. 819 (i9o6).
10 Pound, Individual Interests Involved in Domestic Relations, i4 Mich. L. Rev. 177

(i916); 15 Va. L. Rev.

492 (1929).

"14 U. of Pitt.'L. Rev. 302 (1938).
12Keller v. St. Louis, 152 Mo. 596, 54 S.W. 438 (i899). There is no action solely to determine custody of children. The remedy is by habeas corpus at common law, or under state
statutes that regulate the parent-child relationship in its entirety. People ex rel. Sisson v.
Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E. (2d) 66o (1936); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624
(1925). See Custody and Control of Children, 5 Ford. L. Rev. 460, 464 (1936).
13 That the mother must support the child where she is given custody upon divorce, see
Husband v. Husband, 67 Ind. 583 (1879); Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178, 1o6 N.E. 595 (1914);
but that the father remains obligated for support where the alimony does not expressly cover
the children, see Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N.E. 47z (1887). See 39 Harv. L.

Rev. ooi

(1926).
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there were no rights or duties left in the parent at all after it has occurred;
and they do talk about custody as if it were a property interest, like "possession," or "title," which carried with it a complete and well-understood
4
set of legal rights and duties.'
This literal and artificial presentation of custody which we have today
can be explained in part by its ancestors. The notion of custody goes back
to early times when personal rights were very few, and these few in turn
were tied up with the land itself through the feudal system. 5 Custody of his
children was a thing that the father could and often did transfer to another

6
than his wife by appointing another guardian of these children in his will.'
But at this time the rights of wardship and marriage were also tied up with

the land law and were important items of sale, purchase, and investment
in feudal times.'7 Particularly, custody was tied up with the "binding
out" of children as apprentices to learn a particular trade or profession.',
On a more plebeian level, it was also tied up with indentured servants. 9
In all these cases, the master to whom the parent had bound the child for
a term of years had a very considerable interest in his labor, much as a
slave buyer had an interest in the labor of his slaves, or as any commercial
concern may now have an interest in the work of its employees, who are
engaged by contract for an indefinite period.20 Custody of the child, and
the general parental authority going with this custody, was an integral
part of this large commercial interest.
Under such circumstances we can readily understand (though we need
not approve) that the parties and the courts would talk about "giving"
custody in these apprenticeship cases, where the master had a straight
commercial interest in the work of the child. The real trouble is that this
notion of "giving a child" is in constant use today without apparent of14 Nelson v. Wilson, 97 S.W. (2d) 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), noted in i5 Tex. L. Rev. 375
(1937). But see Mulkey v. Allen, 36 S.W. (2d) i98 (Tex. Com'n App. 1931), noted in 30 Mich.
L. Rev. I55 (1931).
Is z Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence 163-369 (1920); Maine, Ancient Law c. io
(Pollock's ed. 19o6).
z 6 Bi. Comm. *453; Matter of Andrews, L.R. 8 Q.B. 153 (,873); Rex v. Greenhill, 4
A. & E. 624 (1836).
"7See generally i Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 318 et seq. (2d ed. i899).
Is For a collection of authorities on apprenticeship and indentured servants, see Musgrove
v. Kornegay, 52 N.C. *71 (1859); cf. United States v. Bainbridge, Fed. Cas. No. 14,497

(x86).
9Note i8 supra.
Miller v. Miller, 123 Iowa i65, 98 N.W. 631 (i9o4), is by way of dictum contra to these
cases, not in expressly holding that a parent could give all his rights irrevocably in giving
custody to another, but in stating that such a result might perhaps be possible if this intent
were sufficiently precise and unequivocal.
20
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fense either to the courts or the parents themselves. When a mother dies
leaving a baby, and the father'is not equipped to care for the child, he is
said to "give" the child, to his deceased wife's sister perhaps, and if the
sister in turn retains custody of the child for more than a year or so she
feels that the "gift" is permanent, and that the father cannot recover his
2
own child. '
To meet this situation, the courts use varying language. They say that
the transfer of custody will be considered permanent, unless its temporary
nature was expressly indicated;22 or they may make matters worse by
hiding what they really do under talk about "presumptions." In fact the
actual decisions do not establish more than we found in the emancipation
cases: there is no such thing as a parent "giving" custody of his own child
to another, in the irrevocable sense that under no circumstances could he
again have custody of the child solely because of this alleged gift.23 The
rights and duties of parent and child inter se involve a relationship which
may be varied by the introduction of third parties in keeping with the intent of all concerned; it is not a property right that can be sold or possessed
like a haunch of beef sold for cash on the barrel head.24
THE BEST-INTERESTS-OF-THE-CHILD TEST V. THE INTERESTSOF-ALL-TH -PERSONS-INVOLVED TEST

Under the early common law the father had exclusive custody of his
children,*, and this custody could not be taken from him, unless, through
his own fault, he actually kept the child in such degraded conditions that
the child itself might become delinquent. Poverty of the father, laziness
on his part in failing to provide better living conditions for the child, even
the degraded nature of the father's own life, provided that this was not
literally impressed upon the child in his daily living-all these were not
sufficient to take custody from the father.26 But later, when the courts
21

Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (188i); In re Rosenthal, 103 Pa. Super. Ct. 27, 157 AtI.

342 (1931), noted in i8 Va. L. Rev. 458 (1932).

-Bonnett ex rel. Newmeyer v. Bonnett, 6i Iowa igg, i6 N.W. 91 (1883).
State v. Baldwin, 5 N.J. Eq. 454 (1846); In re Galleher, 2 Cal. App. 364, 84 Pac. 352
(i9o5); Cormack v. Marshall, 122 IUl. App. 2o8 (i9o5).
24 Commonwealth v. Graham, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N.E. 7o6 (1892); State ex rel. Scott v.
Lowell, 78 Minn. i66, 8o N.W. 877 (x899); Cochran v. Cochran, 196 N.Y. 86, 89 N.E. 470
23

(I909).
25 See Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1 (1827). For a very just attack on the assertion that custody of the parent and services of the child are correlatives of the father's duty
of support, see Reciprocity of Rights and Duties between Parent and Child, 42 Harv. L. Rev.

112 (1928).
26

Vercer v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27 (i8gi); Rex v. Greenhill, 4 A. & E. 624 (1836).
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held that the mother necessarily had custody on the father's death,2 and
still later in this country when statutes were passed in most states giving
custody to the father and mother jointly, 5 the courts began to talk about
the "presumptive" right of the father (or the father and mother) to the
custody of the child-a presumption that could not be overcome unless
"the best interest of the child required it."'' 9 If the courts met the question, should custody be awarded to a person other than a parent merely
because that person was of high character,3 entertained real affection for
the child, 3" or could give the child much greater cultural and educational
advantages (because he had more money) than could the parents, 32 then

the courts usually avoided a straight answer to this question, by talking
of presumptions again and by saying that under the particular facts in
that case, the best interests of the child were not sufficient to take custody from the parent in view of the initial presumption in the parent's

favor."
There is very impressive authority for all this.34 When the courts gave
up talking of absolute rights of custody in the parents (short of proved injury to the child from their own disgraceful conduct), they took to talking
of the "best interests of the child" as the true basis for awarding custody,
27 For the statutory change in England, see Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, 49 & 50
Vict., C.27, § 5. The American cases dealing with this shift in recognizing the mother's right
to custody at least on the death of the father are well collected in Matter of Badger, 286 Mo.
139, 226 S.W. 936 (r920).

28For a summary of the statutes on joint custody see 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 18
(1936).
29 "To abandon this comparison and to make use of the ordinary legal phraseology, the
father will be preferred over the mother if all other things are equal and either parent will be
even more clearly preferred over a third person, unless, the third person is better fitted for the
custody of the child; but in all cases the test is not the 'rights' of the persons claiming custody
but the welfare of the child." Brown, The Custody of Children, 2 Ind. L.J. 325, 326 (1926).
This rule has received recent restatement in Lancey v. Shelley, 2 N.W. (2d) 781 (Iowa 1942).
30See Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 At. 679 (1897).
31 Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 65o (i88i).
32 Corn v. Hollon, 292 Ind. 248,
(Tex. Civ. App. i92o).

232

N.E. 587 (i921); Clayton v. Kerbey,

226

S.W. 1z17

33 For an excellent discussion of this innocent sleight-of-hand in juggling legal concepts,
see the statement of Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Green, Fed. Cas. No. 15,256 (1824).
34 See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 65o (i88i). Indeed one could almost say that there is no
case which does not fully affirm that the "best interests of the child" is the ultimate test, if
indeed the court has gotten beyond the mere juggling of legal presumptions of rights to custody
in the father, mother, and others. After a full discussion of all the cases in his article, Professor
Brown reaches this conclusion, ". . .. the general attitude of the court that the welfare of
the child is controlling ....is entirely correct and praiseworthy." Brown, op. cit. supra note
29, at 330.
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and they tended to let this principle crowd out the presumptions in the
parent's favor, until this test of the "best interests of the child" has grown
in emphasis so that it is now in fact, though not always in theory, almost
the sole basis for the award of custody.35 For that matter, the law reviews
and critical writers generally approve this test without exception and hail
the high achievement of the courts in deciding this delicate question by
such worthy principles.36 Courts and legal writers alike seem so pleased
with themselves in hitting on the best-interests-of-the-child test, that they
7
are both unable and unwilling to think of anything else.3
Mr. Justice Brewer set the fashion and did much to establish the whole
doctrine by his famous opinion in Chapsky v. Wood, 38 when he was a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas before going to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The case involved an equity proceeding brought by a
father to recover custody of his young daughter, whom he himself had
"given" to his deceased wife's sister. The child was given by the father to
this sister soon after birth upon the death of the mother, when the father
was in no position to provide an adequate home for the baby. The gift
was not expressly for any length of time, though the child did stay with
this sister for five years before the father was able to provide an adequate
home with his father (the child's grandfather) and his own unmarried
sister. The mother's sister who wanted to retain the custody was married,
had children of her own, and was conscientiously providing a wholesome
home for the child. The court did not say unqualifiedly that the gift of
the child was not revocable under proper circumstances, but it did say,
first, that such a gift could not be revoked where the parent had caused
the third person reasonably to rely on continued custody where that person was worthy; and, second, that custody would not be taken from the
third person under the circumstances of this case because the best interests of the child required that she remain with the mother's sister. 39 With
evident relish, the court repudiated the former rule which affirmed the
35Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (x88i), and cases there cited.
36
22

Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations

372-75 (1931);

Brown, op. cit. supra note 31;

Minn. L. Rev. 899 (1938); 30 Mich. L. Rev. r55 (1931); Friedman, The Parental Right to

Control the Religious Education of the Child, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485 (1916).
37 The cases and the commentaries indicate that the courts and writers are content with the
"best interests of the child" and do not press further even to discuss "the best interests" of
other persons (father, mother, etc.) who are necessary parties to the custody proceedings.
Note 36 supra.
3" 26 Kan. 650 (i88i).
39 The court does not directly discuss the effect on any other person of the award of the
custody to the aunt.
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parent's primary right to custody, and, having rejected this, the court
luxuriated in the solemn self-righteousness of applying the best-interestsof-the-child test against all comers. The last part of Mr. Justice Brewer's
opinion has been widely quoted by other courts and text writers and uni0
formly approved.4
Again, and lastly, the child has had, and has today, all that a mother's love and care
can give. The affection which a mother may have and does have, springing from the
fact that a child is her offspring, is an affection which perhaps no other can really
possess; but, so far as it is possible, springing from years of patient care of a little,
helpless babe, from association and as an outgrowth from those little cares and motherly attentions bestowed upon it, an affection for the child is seen in Mrs. Wood that can
be found nowhere else. And it is apparent that, so far as a mother's love can be
equaled, its foster mother has that love, and will continue to have it.41
On the other hand, if she goes to the house of her father's family, the female inmates are an aunt just ripening into womanhood, and a grandmother; they have never
seen the child; they have no affection for it springing from years of companionship.
While she is a child of perhaps a favorite son or brother, she is also the child of a disowned or repudiated daughter-in-law and sister-in-law, and the appeal which the child
will make naturally-and the child is one to make a strong appeal to anyone--will
always be shadowed and clouded by the fact that she comes from one who was not a
favorite in that family.
Human impulses are such that doubtless they would form an affection for the child
-it is hardly possible to believe otherwise; but to that deep, strong, patient love which
springs from either motherhood, or from a patient care during years of helpless babyhood, they will be strangers.
They cannot have this; and to my mind, I am frank to say, this last is the controlling consideration. And these three considerations are those which compel us to say
that we cannot believe it wise or prudent to take this child away from its present
home, where it has been looked upon as an own child; and, if we should see a child of
ours in the same circumstances, we cannot believe that we should deem it wise or
prudent to advise a change, notwithstanding the pecuniary advantages that might
seem to be offered to it.
The judgment of the court therefore is, that the child will be remanded to the respondents; and the petition is dismissed, at the cost of the petitioner.42
40 Note 36 supra.
41 The court had previously commented on the greater wealth on the father's side, but dismissed this as unimportant on the ground that the grandfather was an elderly unresponsive
man and the father was also somewhat cold. "He [the father] seems to us like a man still and
cold, and a warm-hearted child would shrink and wither under the care of such a nature rather
than ripen and develop." Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 656-57 (x88i). Of course, this
estimate of the facts may be fair but since it seems clear that the court was prejudiced in
judging other facts, it seems at least likely that this also is an overstatement. In litigation of
this kind in open court, the father might well feel a certain diffidence and embarrassment which
would make him seem unduly reserved, while this aunt, in her self-assertive emotionalism,
could give free expression to her affections, which put her in an attractive light before the
court.
42 Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 65o, 658 (Cixi).
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Apart from the question of whether all this amounts to good law, is it
good morals, or honest sentiment, or even fair comment on the actual
facts of the case? For instance, the court says that as a practical matter,
this sister of the deceased mother is the only one who could give even a
fair substitute of mother's love to this child, or receive the love of the
child herself. But the child is only five years old, this sister of the mother
has a home and other children of her own to absorb her interests, and there
is nothing of an affirmative nature to show that this child got more than
routine, wholesome care in this home; certainly there is nothing to support this sweeping conclusion that even routine care could not be obtained
for the child elsewhere. After going into these fantastic raptures
over the mother's sister, the court has this to say of the father's
home and the father's sister: "On the other hand, if she goes to the
house of her father's family, the female inmates are an aunt just ripening
into womanhood, and a grandmother ..... ,'43 This is so extreme in its
prejudice that it does not have even sufficient contact with the facts to be
funny. Even extreme irony or riotous humor must have some connection
with the facts in order to make its point by contrast. Isn't the mother's
sister also "female," isn't she also an "inmate" of her home, and isn't she
also the "aunt" of the child involved? In all these respects, the two persons in question are identical, yet the court goes out of its way to heap
terms of. slurring contempt upon one while it flies off into lyrical encomiums of the other. The sole difference that the court mentions is that the
aunt.on the father's side is "just ripening into young womanhood." Is
that a crime? In keeping with the best psychological and sociological
opinion, is it not rather the indication of a time of life when the sympathies
and the generous instincts are most active, so that this aunt might serve
the child's interests much better than the other one?
Perhaps a fair view of the case comes down to this. justice Brewer and
his brethren, engaged for the most part with legal problems of a very different nature, took hold of this one with the relish that comes from dealing
with attractive new material, and were guilelessly anxious to show that
the impressive weight of their judicial labors did not make them impervious to human interests of a more elusive nature. Justice Brewer was a
fine man, a very competent technical lawyer, and a jurist of considerable
vision in the field of judicial statesmanship. But he was not at home in
juvenile court work. Does not the decision itself in fact submerge the
higher interests of childhood? True, the aunt on the .mother's side seems
able to provide a normal home with other children, giving advantages of
43Ibid.,

at 657.
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wholesome general surroundings that the father's home might find it hard
to duplicate. But the court does not decide the case on that fair and understandable basis. On the contrary, it is determined to rest its decision on
effusions about "mother love" that are entirely unsupported by the facts.
For instance, what if a married couple, unfortunately, have only one
child, while a sister or brother of the husband or wife has a family of several children. Would this in itself justify a court in taking their only child
from these parents, substantially breaking up their home, and destroying
the interdependence of their lives, merely because this brother or sister
could give this more "normal" home life? One doesn't need to read Emerson to know that there is a great flexibility and a high degree of adjustment in the compensations of life. 44 The only child, in the case we are supposing, would lose in companionship of other children in the home, but
surely this could be largely made up to him through his companionship at
school and the hospitable atmosphere of his home to the free and happy
visits of other children, while the high quality (though not unduly intense) companionship of his parents, and their complete devotion to his
welfare, would be a compensating source of cultural wealth which a child
in a large family might miss.
We can be almost certain that these compensating advantages of the
single child in the home should prevail, where, as in the Ckapsky case, the
alternative is to have the child grow up in a foster home, where he is not
even an adopted child, and where this divided allegiance might well become a source of emotional conflicts and unhappiness as the child grew
older.
But such unfair results are quite likely where the court uses a test that
covers only a part of the interests involved, and, as it were, forces a partial view from the beginning. The test laid down here and approved elsewhere is "the welfare of the child." But such a test will in fact injure the
child, and, from its very partiality, shows a lack of understanding of the
child itself. In its artificial parade of taking high moral ground, it really
sinks to a very low level, since it decides cases by ignoring the actual needs
of the child, and throws the child's relationships generally into a condition
that is unnatural, and unwholesome. Is the ideal of rough and tumble
mediocrity, which the court decisions tend to realize, the best the courts
can do in this situation? For instance, in the Chapsky case, the little girl is
going to grow up, and when she is a few years older she will begin asking
questions, and, even more important, the other children with whom she
plays will ask questions. "Why don't I live with my father, if I have a
44 Emerson's

Essay on Compensations.
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father?" "Is he a bad man?" "Is he in jail?" she may ask. Or, coming
from the other children, "You must be ashamed of your father, or you
would live with him, the way we do, or at least he would be dead, and you
would have him in the cemetery like respectable people do!" "So your
father was so bad, that the police had to go and take you away from him!
Isn't that awful? You poor thing!" Is this altogether the wholesome result that the court envisaged?
Perhaps the trouble here is basically somewhat the same as we noted in
the alleged doctrine of "complete emancipation" and the alleged power of
a parent to "give" his child to another. We are dealing with relationships,
not with property interests, in all three cases, and this is particularly important in this third case, where the courts have fixed upon the test of
"the best interest of the child" as conclusive. Would it not be better to
use the same sociological approach that would be involved in situations
generally where there is a basic conflict of interests between the parties to
the litigation?4 Thus in deciding custody cases the court could try to give
effect to all the individual interests subsumed under all the social interests
involved.46 In this way the court would not have to use artificial presumptions of any kind--either presumed rights of the parents to custody, or a
presumption for or against the alleged permanence of the "gift" of the
child, where the parent has transferred custody without expressly delimiting its duration.
Much good might come of this. Even the best interests of the child
cannot be served in fact without considering the interests of other members of the family. The effects of custody are more important for the welfare of the child (bearing as it does on his interests in daily life in a thousand ways) than they are for the adult members of the family, and particularly the claimants to custody. In addition to this, and apart from sentiment or affection, we quite justly put the emphasis on the children, because with them lies the future, dnd it is only through them that any
(whether or not they are parents themselves) can hope to have a continued
world for their efforts. This is a demonstrable fact. If there are no children, the world must come to an end with the death of those now living.
Such a situation would not only remove incentive for daily effort of every
kind among all people everywhere, but it would also bring a general
45 See generally, Korkunov, General Theory of Law §25 (Hastings' transl. 1922); Charmont,
The Conflict of Interests Legally Protected in French Law, 13 Il1. L. Rev. 461, 693 (rX9);
Pound, Preventive Justice in Social Work, Proceedings of the National Conference of Social
Work 151 (1923); Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343 (1915).
46 Pound, op. cit. supra note io.
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despair which would cause disintegration and destruction of the people
now living at a much earlier date than their life-span under normal conditions would make probable.
On these two definite bases, we gladly grant the primacy of the child's
interest, but it is none the less extremely superficial to state the problem
in terms of these interests alone. For instance, in the Chapsky case, the
young father who is asking the custody certainly has interests which the
true welfare of the child itself should cause the court to respect. This
young man has no wife or other children. It might well be that his companionship with this little girl would become a matter of priceless value to
both of them and that both their lives would be enriched by it. And this
relationship might very probably be far deeper and richer for the child
than any she would find in her aunt's family, where she was not even
adopted, and had at most the legal and social status of an outsider. And
here we must note again what we mentioned in an indirect way at first:
it is of primary importance that the court should keep its eye on excellence,
and seek to secure the very richest, finest life for the child, rather than fix
its eye on mediocrity and feel that its duty is done when it has secured socalled normal home life. Here again the old analogies of "market value"
and "fair value" that the courts use in fixing their crude approximations
of real value when working oul their remedies in disputes over property,
are sadly inadequate when applied to children. Custody is determined in
a court of equity, custody involves human lives, and (more important
still) custody involves new human lives with nearly.all their future before
them. Perhaps we get on fairly well with general standards for fixing the
price of hogs, but the result would be ridiculous, if it were not so degrading, to use these standards in the case of children. Platitudes that tend to
glorify apple-faced mediocrity and to defeat the higher joys, excellencies,
and achievements of life are particularly offensive when the future welfare
of children is involved.
The best-interests-of-the-child test is inevitably artificial and tends to
produce unfair or even vicious results when applied in fact, unless one uses
this test as a philosophical concept, and thinks of the child in an abstract
or ideal sense, as an Hegelian might do. Under this approach, one can
think of the best interests of the child, as an idealistic persona, in keeping
with the highest cultural values, and in a manner that is entirely compatible with a like complete idealistic realization of all the interests of all
the other members of the family, as well as of third persons who are connected with the custody proceedings.
In keeping with the dominant sociological approach at the present
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time, especially in the field of family law, it does seem preferable in this
case to consider individualinterests and social interests in reaching a result
that gives effect as fully as possible to the social interests involved, subsuming the individual interests of each person connected with the award
of custody in a fair way under the appropriate and fully recognized social
interests. 47 Inevitably when custody is awarded the lives of those who
formerly had custody of the child are affected, as well as the lives of those
to whom the court will give custody in the proceedings before it. All of
these people have legally recognized interests in this relationship. It is of
decided social and cultural importance for the entire community where the
law is in force. If ever the law should keep its eye on the dynamic quality
of the facts involved when juggling legal concepts, this is such a case. The
one who has custody is a good person, we hope, and everything about his
character and way of life will affect the child favorably; but, by common
experience everywhere, the child may have even more influence on those
with whom it lives than they have on it. In a word, it is not a field for
fixed legal concepts adapted to isolated instances, like a single contract or
a single tort. It is a relationship that has within it almost all the complexity of life itself. If ever there was a case in which the courts should weigh
carefully all the individual interests and all the social interests involved,
this would seem to be that case. Perhaps the final thing to note is that the
growth of the child itself requires this, and this can be given effect sociologically, although the idealistic approach may seem the more convincing
in this one aspect. In a word, we grow by what we do and by what we
give (hpwever you phrase it psychologically) more than by what others do
for us or by what we receive. Thus in considering the interests of other
persons in a custody proceeding, we quite justly are concerned for these
other persons themselves; but here again the best-interests-of-the-child
test itself requires that the interest of others be realized, in order that the
child may have the richest, fullest life through what it does and what it
45
gives.
But whether the courts use an idealistic or sociological approach in determining custody, it does seem of the first importanceothat they consider
ethical values, even those of a somewhat elusive nature. Perhaps the
47Pound, op. cit. supra note io.
48 On the reciprocal nature of legal rights, and the growth of individuals through what they

give as well as what they receive, see Hocking, Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and
Rights 58 et seq. (1926); Thorndike, Human Nature and the Social Order 4o3 et seq. (1940).
On some phases of the ethical side in a sociological approach, see Modem Theories of Law
(Essay on Roscoe Pound by Sir Morris Amos) 86 et seq. (1933); Sayre, Mr. Justice HolmesPhilosopher, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 187 (1942).
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chief objection to an idealistic approach generally, is that this idea, which
is the assumed test, tends to lose its dynamic quality so that the courts as
well as able jurists everywhere come to accept things as they are as the
actual equivalent of the realization of the idea in fact. Like poor Hegel,
they come to defend the status quo regardless of the high quality of their
ethical criteria. On the other hand, the danger with the sociological approach is that courts and jurists generally do not realize that consciously
or unconsciously they must evaluate the material which they secure
through their readings of the cases, or their so-called "factual" surveys
of the way people live in society. Because of this self-deception, they too
come to look at things as they are so long and so reverently that they
come to be self-hypnotized by these alleged "facts" and defend the status
quo, just as the idealist is hypnotized by a too intense concentration on
his own "idea." For both the idealist and the sociologist, it may finally
all come down to a matter of gazing in the crystal ball.
It is supremely important in custody cases, which deal so intimately
with human lives, that these twin follies shall not frustrate the actual accomplishment of the court, whatever method is used. In custody cases we
deal directly with complicated ethical and psychological values for all the
people involved. For instance, however much one may want another's
welfare, he may in fact be injured if he is given no opportunity to work
and play with other people, and find his growth and his happiness in
seeking the welfare of others. But for this kind of growth in a child, there
must be not merely heavy-handed mediocrity or well-intentioned ignorance, but the highest possible degree of excellence and understanding in
the one having custody. This essential emphasis on excellence is not only
not realized, but not sought after or even discussed, in these very opinions
that talk in high-flown language about the welfare of the child. And in
striving to have the courts consider all the interests involved, on the highest possible plane, we will still fail if the courts, in using either an idealistic
or sociological approach, become hypnotized by their own method and fail
in fact to give effect to the actual ethical values involved. If you ask exactly what this method should be, I hestitate to say more than this: ethical values are elusive things. Many of our jurisprudential methods are excellent in theory, but often so evolved and so indirect that the ethical content itself is lost or hopelessly diluted before it reaches the actual result in
daily life from the decision of the court. Perhaps the best method is the
one that gets the ethical content discussed directly and immediately and
in fact gets this ethical content into the results of a court decision in terms
of the daily living of those affected by this decision.
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CUSTODY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND IN DIVORCE CASES

Apart from the criminal law, and the situations affecting custody generally in private law, the problems of custody in the conflict of laws and
in the law of divorce and separation must receive our attention. So far
as the conflict of laws goes, the bases of custody have, from very early
times, been considered different from other matters, and especially different from the determination of marriage, annulment, separation, and divorce, with all of which the custody of children is, of course, closely connected. With certain qualifications of great importance, the validity of a
marriage (or its annulment) is determined by the law of the state of the
marriage, while the validity of a divorce or a separation decree is determined by the law of the state issuing it. This assumes, of course, that the
parties were domiciled there for divorce purposes, and that the decree conforms to the requirements of the matrimonial domicile under the Haddock
doctrine. 49 And, more important for our purposes, perhaps, these decrees,
once validly made, are, within rather widelimits, given full and, if necessary, detailed enforcement in every other state. Not so in the case of custody.5 o No uniformity is even attempted in this field. A court of another
state may have decreed divorce or separation, and as an incident have
made detailed provision for alimony and custody of the children. Everything, including complicated arrangements for the alimony, may be enforced in other states except the requirements about the custody of the
children. These are determined de novo by the courts of the domicile of
the one having the custody at the time (this being also by law the domicile
of the child).5'
The main reason for this seems to be that under the doctrine of parens
patriae the state of the child's present domicile not only is ultimately liable
for its support in case of need but also is vitally interested in its education.
Hence it has an inherent right to determine the maintenance of the child,
and, if necessary, the custody of the child, for itself.Y
This breaks down a desirable uniformity in the foreign enforcement of
equity decrees affecting family relations. But it seems that there is real
49 Haddock v. Haddock, 20X U.S. 562 (1905).
so Rest., Conflict of Laws §§ '44, 146 (1934); Warren v. Warren, 127 Cal. App. 231, i5 P.
(2d) 5s6 (1932). See generally on jurisdiction in custody cases, Jurisdictional Bases of Custody
Decrees, 53 Harv. L. Rev. X024 (1940).
s' This is in keeping with the latitude allowed by the Restatement, op. cit. supra note 5o,
at § 144.
52Keenean v. Keenean, 5 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 12 (C. P. i9o6); cf. Nutt, Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, 5 Social Work Yearbook 201 (1939); The Child, the Family and the Court 57
(U.S. Dep't Labor, Children's Bureau 1929).
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need for this and that the benefits are worth the price.53 It does seem important, however, that here, as in the other instances we have considered,
the courts should not decide these cases on the basis of the best-interestsof-the-child test in keeping with their most excellent intentions. Here, as
in the other instances, this test is too narrow, and works injury to the
child as well as' injustice to others whose interests are inextricably involved. A consideration of all the interests involved in this conflict of
laws situation would in most cases tend to give fuller effect to the decree of
the court of original jurisdiction that had the problem of divorce, alimony,
and many other matters before it for determination all at one time, and
presumably with a view to the interests of everyone concerned. Hence in
an indirect way at least this emphasis on the interests of everyone involved in custody cases would not only result in a wiser determination of
the custody and maintenance problems themselves, but would also aid the
extraterritorial effect of equity decrees and the security and dignity that
come from uniformity in the enforcement of such decrees throughout the
country."4
As for custody in divorce cases, the problem is quite similar to the one
involved in "total" as against "partial" emancipation which we have already considered. Where, under the local law, the father had this custody
or custody was jointly in the father and mother, and the court upon
divorce gave custody to the mother, does this impliedly carry with it all
the rights and duties incident to the parent-child relation (subject, of
course, to further order by the court) so as to be tantamount in its effect
to "total" emancipation? Here again some courts have substantially
reached this result, and in doing so they have proceeded on what perhaps
we may now call the property theory of custody, rather than the relational
one. But we have viewed the theory of "total" emancipation with regret
no matter where it appears, and whether or not it is directly or indirectly
involved. Similarly, the "property" theory of custody (in the sense that
custody is regarded as a fixed and complete body of rights and duties to be
transferred like ownership of a hog or a bushel of potatoes) seems to be inadequate. The transfer of custody in divorce cases as in other cases should
not irrevocably take all the rights and duties from the parent in keeping
with the false theory of total emancipation. The scope of the custody
should be expressly delimited wherever that is reasonable under the cir53 Jurisdictional
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S4 Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Cornell L.Q. 1 (1921); Bingham, The

American Law Institute v. The Supreme Court in the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock,
Cornell L.Q. 393, 402 (1936).
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cumstances; and where it cannot fairly be so delimited it should be construed in keeping with the other provisions and purposes of the decree. In
no case, however, should it be construed as a complete alienation of all the
parents' rights and duties in this relationship. Even if the parents freely
and by their own indenture tried to transfer all these rights and duties
under alleged giving of custody or "total" emancipation, still the courts
should not give this effect to their acts. At common law, and apart from
our Constitution, no one under any circumstances can legally bind himself to become a slave, or to commit a crime, or to do acts involving moral
turpitude that are not crimes, or to agree not to resort to the courts or the
law-enforcing agencies for the protection of his rights. There is (or should
be) no such thing as a complete severance of rights and duties between
parent and child, apart from statute.5s
This general result makes for good sense and efficiency as well as the
preservation of cultural values in the divorce situation. Thus where custody is given to the mother and the mother dies, custody would revert
automatically to the father, so that at no time would the child be left
defenseless, without anyone responsible for his welfare s6 This result does
not in any way qualify the power of the court by express decrees to give
custody to someone other than the father in these or other cases. Similarly the right to the child's earnings would go to the father and would continue with him, unless it passed impliedly or expressly to the one having
custody.5s But such granting of the right to the earnings of the child may
impliedly pass to the one having custody, even though the parent continues liable for the child's support~5
CUSTODY IN THE CRDNAL LAW AND IN THE FIELD

OF COURT PROCEDURE

Some may well think that the most objectionable part of the present
law of custody has not yet been mentioned. Surely he would be a bold
man who would venture to fix precedence in these matters, though if anyone were to claim that the procedural methods in custody cases were the
worst part of the whole business, it would be difficult to prove him wrong.
The basic rule in constitutional law that one is entitled to reasonable notice and a fair hearing quite properly is held to apply in custody cases only

55 And, of course, there is no sure statute in the field of custody alone, although there are
statutes providing for adoption by court procedure in every state, and after such adoption it
may be fair to say that all parental rights and duties in the natural parent are terminated.
-6Jensen v. Sorenson, 211 Iowa 354, 233 N.W. 717 (1930).
57Keller v. St. Louis, 152 Mo. 596, 54 S.W. 438 (1899).
58 Evans v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 213 Mo. App. 101, 247 S.W. 213 (1923).
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within appropriate limits.5 9 For instance, if a parent were abusing a child,
or (perhaps incident to divorce) one parent had kidnapped the child from
the other parent to whom custody had been awarded, it would be highly
impractical and injurious to the child itself if nothing could be done until
the offending parent in these two cases had been given notice that a hearing would be held under which custody might be transferred to another.
This would give the offender warning and might cause him either to wreak
his vengeance on the child or abscond with the child beyond the jurisdiction of the court and then perhaps go into hiding. In keeping with the
provisions of local statutes, interested persons or law-enforcing officers
themselves can take the child into the custody of the court, providing
only that the parents are given due notice of some later hearing at which
the custody shall be determined, and providing that this hearing itself
shall be fair.a" But all these proceedings concerned with the custody of
children are in equity. This means that there is no right to a jury trial,
even in matters that would involve the criminal law for adults, unless it
happens to involve the more serious criminal offenses for older children,
entitling them to jury trial and other safeguards, 6' as in the case of adults.
In theory the constitutional provisions about trial by jury and about cruel
and unusual punishments do not apply to children in this field.6 The glib
convention is that these constitutional rights are incident to punishment
or to deprivation of liberty or property which do not occur at all in the
case of the correction of children. In theory there is no punishment and
the criminal statutes do not apply.63 In loving solicitude the court of
chancery confines the child in a reform school for perhaps ten or fifteen
years, where the officials may work him and beat him as perhaps no state
prison in the country would permit, and all this is done in the name of
saving him from punishment and guarding and protecting him against all
oppression or evil so that he may be prepared to lead the good life when he
gets out.64 The fact that his fellows in the reform school are quite as efficient in training him in the ways of crime as any hardened convicts would
be in a state penitentiary still does not change the theory or affect the
law.6s
59 State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 5o Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892).
6o Ibid.
61Lee v. McCleland, 157 Ind. 84, 6o N.E. 692 (igo).
62 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. x98 (x9o5); Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302,
45 So. 499 (1907).
63 Cinque

S.E.

v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 AtI. 678 (1923); State v. Burnett, 179 X.C. 735,

711 (1920).

64 Baldwin,

Children's Courts §§ 35 et. seq. (1938).

6SNutt, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2o et seq.
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Of course, broad powers in the state on the theory of parens patriae, to
be exercised by the court of equity, are necessary and inevitable. But the
situation in most states, in which there are substantially no limits whatever on these powers, is not to be justified." We are well within the limits
of accurate statement when we say that nowhere else in law does a court
of equity have such unregulated power over such vast and important interests as in its power to take custody from one person and give it to another, even to a reform school, thus substantially controlling the lives of all
persons under twenty-one years of age.
That equity needs general power in this whole field, none would seriously question. The real issue seems to be one of regulation of this power so
that it may be exercised in different ways for particular groups or categories and to further particular purposes that the legislature shall fix upon
or that shall be formulated into rather definite principles through the decisions of the courts themselves. 61 Is the wide discretion which the courts
concededly need in this field necessarily co-extensive with unlimited power, and are there no recognized principles or guides whatever in its exercise?
The basic concept is that the state as parens patriae protects the children against the application of the criminal law, as well as against the
reprehensible conduct of anyone having custody at the time (including the
parents). The theory is that commitment of the child to a reform school
is not punishment at all, since it is not done on the basis of penalty for
particular acts committed; rather it is for the betterment and general welfare of the child's whole life.
The main attack on the practice of the courts within the limits of their
general theory is that in fact a juvenile court (exercising equitable powers) may commit a child to a reform school for five years because it has
found him guilty (without a trial by jury) of doing an act which, if done
by an adult, would entitle the adult to trial by jury and subject him to not
more than three months' detention in a house of correction if he were found
guilty.68 If the basis in both cases is penalty for particular acts done, then
this discrepancy between the penalties of the child and the adult is inde6 Cf.

Baldwin, op. cit. supra note 64.
7This, of course, is a question of what the courts should do in the future. It is at least in
keeping with the approach suggested here, and with critical comments on juvenile courts and
the needs of children committed by those courts to juvenile homes. Cf. The Child, the Family,
and the Court, note 52 supra.
68For an analysis of the shortcomings of juvenile courts in performing their function, see
2 Abbot, The Child and the State 334-39 (1938); cf. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L.
Rev. io4 (igog).
6
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fensible. No amount of high-sounding sophistry about the court's sending
an adult to prison for punishment while it sends the child to a reform
school in loving kindness for its own good, will convince anybody who
pays attention to the plain facts. Life in a reform school may be more severe (and for that matter, more injurious to character) than life in a penitentiary. Briefly, it is submitted that where the court acts substantially
on the basis of particular acts done, then confinement in institutions for
children should correspond roughly in length and in other ways to commitment for particular offenses by adults. This test should go to the power and exercise of reasonable discretion by the judge committing the child.
The judge could safely be left with his general equitable powers in the case
69
of children and not be expressly limited by statute as in the case of adults.
In keeping with the real equitable powers in this field, the justification
for the court's committing the child to a reformatory for a long period
(perhaps the rest of his minority) is that the commitment is not for particular acts done, but for the necessary guidance and welfare of the child's
whole life. For such commitment, however, there should be detailed showing of the child's character and general needs in addition to his committing
any one or more particular offenses.
It may still be urged that this is indeed the theory behind the present
practice.7 ° In this abstract sense it might well be substantially impossible
to prove the case one way or the other. Where a court has such vast powers, as in the awarding of custody, and where particular theories of a court
are not given definite expression in detailed decisions that set forth the
particular basis and scope of each case, then the great thing is to note
what the court does and judge by this.?X If in a particular case there is no
significant evidence except that the child committed a single act which for
an adult would be petty larceny, with a penalty of confinement for a few
months, and if in that case the court sends the child to a reformatory for ten
years, this should be reversed on appeal on the ground that such a sentence
did not correspond to the facts; and in law such a sentence should not be
imposed unless i) there was a substantial showing of general depravity in
the child's whole life, and 2) it was reasonable to hold that such commitment
to an institution was the best way to further the child's general welfare
under the circumstances. These two definite findings very generally are
69 Cf. Mack, op. cit. supra note 68.

70 In this connection, it may be well to refer to the general doctrine of constitutional law
that if a particular statute is unconstitutional in its factual results, then the statute is also
invalid although this would not appear from its wording alone.
7r Cf. note 70 supra.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

not made by the courts now before committing children for long terms to
institutions, and we may safely' say that the tests we have suggested have
not been met where children have been so committed for long periods.
We note finally that the second requirement should also be an important
limitation on the court's general discretion in this field. There should be
detailed evidence and the court should expressly find that commitment
for a long period, on the theory of the child's general welfare, would in
fact help the child more72 than perhaps a suspended sentence leaving custody with the parents, with a probation officer or other specially equipped
person to supervise the living conditions and activities of the child.
72In a word, what is proposed here is clearly constitutional, and does not cut down on the
inherent powers of the court of equity. The proposal merely is that express statutes be passed
in each state, either i) fixing the actual punishments in terms of time of confinement in the case
of infants for particular offenses, or. 2) requiring the court to follow the penalties given for
adults in the case of children also. In any case, however, these state statutes should require
express and detailed findings by the court before it could confine an infant to a state correctional institution for a considerable period on the theory that the child's general character required a long period of such training both for the child's own sake and for the protection of
the community.

